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Maritime security is especially critical for countries like Singapore, an island 
nation situated on the world’s busiest shipping routes, whose economic prosperity is 
highly dependent on international trade from her busy port, petrochemical complexes and 
other high value units located along her coastline. 
This thesis borrows the ideas and techniques suggested for identifying air threats 
in the Air Defense Laboratory (ADL) and employ them to identify asymmetric maritime 
threats in port and waterways.  Each surface track is monitored by a compound multi-
agent system that comprise of the several intent models, each containing a nested multi-
agent system.  The attributes that define intent models of friendly, neutral, unknown and 
potentially hostile surface contacts are obtained from movement and communication 
protocols defined by the Vessel Traffic Information System (VTIS), maritime navigation 
rules and cues for surface warfare threat assessment.  The underlying cognitive 
mechanism of the models is conceptual blending. 
The study includes a simulation of a mock VTS for the port of Singapore and 
surrounding waterways to test the ability of the models to compress data and information 
regarding multiple simulated surface contacts into integration networks and then 
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The attacks on the Khobar Towers in 1996, the terrorist bombing of the USS 
COLE in Yemen in 2000, and the bombing of the French-flagged supertanker Limburg in 
the Arabian Sea off Yemen's Hadramut coast in October 2002 have brought into focus 
the reality of asymmetric maritime terrorism and the vulnerabilities of ports, waterways 
and shipping routes.  Maritime security is especially critical for countries like Singapore, 
an island nation situated on the world’s busiest shipping routes, whose economic 
prosperity is highly dependent on international trade from her busy port, transshipping 
container terminals, petrochemical complexes and other high value units located along 
her coastline. 
This thesis is inspired by similar work done in the area of air threat assessment.  
The thesis borrows the ideas and techniques suggested for identifying air threats in the 
Air Defense Laboratory (ADL) and employ them to identify asymmetric maritime threats 
in the relatively less investigated but very important area of port and waterways security. 
Implementing four intent models of surface contacts, Friend, Neutral, Unknown, 
and Potentially Hostile, a compound multi-agent system (MAS) monitors every surface 
contact by representing each contact with a Track agent.  Each Track agent contains 
another nested multi-agent system that comprise of the four intent models.  The 
underlying cognitive mechanism for the intent models is conceptual blending, also known 
as conceptual integration.  The theory of conceptual blending is one possible explanation 
of how humans are able to think: giving meanings to external information and events, 
compressing the information into integration networks and eventually learning and 
gaining experience. 
Vessel Traffic Service manuals, international and inland maritime navigation 
rules, surface threat assessment requirements reports and known terrorist tactics serves as 
source material for the attributes that define the intent models of friendly, neutral, 
unknown and potentially hostile surface contacts in ports and.  Currently these models 
use the following information to identify hostility and potential threats before they are 
able to strike: 
 xvi
1. the movement and communication rules used by vessels registered with the 
Vessel Traffic Systems (VTS) used in ports and waterways, and 
2. the cues for surface warfare threat assessment that is used by experienced surface 
warfare officers. 
This study features a mock VTS-C2 system to evaluate the MAS.  Similar to the 
ADL, simulations of scenarios with hostilities in the port of Singapore and surrounding 
waterways test the ability of the models to identify the intent of multiple simulated 
surface contacts by blending data and information into integration networks.  Expansion 
of the integration networks can yield the intent identification process of a surface contact 
used by the compound MAS.  Face validation by domain experts generated very 
encouraging results. 
The thesis does not cover the issue of track detection.  The issue of tactical actions 
resulting from a potentially hostile track identified by the system is also beyond the scope 




The Port of Singapore is one of the busiest in the world, in terms of both gross 
shipping tonnage and twenty-foot equivalent unit (TEU) container throughput [1] [2].  It 
is the focal point of approximately 200 shipping routes which connect Singapore to more 
than 600 ports in 120 countries and there are about 1,000 ships in the port at any time [1].  
Located a stone’s throw away from the port is the Singapore Cruise Center, the cruise 
hub of the Asia Pacific for passenger liners as well as regional and domestic ferries [1].  
Situated on nearby off-shore islands are also oil terminals and refineries managed by 
many multi-national petroleum companies [3].  Every day, hundreds of vessels of all 
sizes, ranging from small dinghies and bumboats to barges and fishing trawlers to large 
cruise liners and oil tankers, traverse the deep but narrow band of sea surrounding the 
island state as they go about performing their daily activities [4]. 
While the Maritime Port Authority (MPA) of Singapore is responsible for 
overseeing and monitoring the traffic in the sea lanes vessel movements, ensuring 
navigational safety and managing the marine environment in the port [5], the defense of 
the harbor against potential sea threats falls in the hands of the Singapore Police Coast 
Guard (PCG) and the Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN).  The PCG enforces the law 
and maintains order in Singapore Territorial Waters (STW).   They also conduct Search 
and Rescue and assist other maritime agencies such as the MPA [6].  The RSN is 
responsible for the overall defense of the Singapore territorial waters against sea-borne 
threats and to protect the sea lines of communications that covers the Singapore Straits 
and its access routes [7]. 
Together, the PCG and RSN protect the STW, covering an area of more than 200 
square nautical miles, larger than of the Singapore mainland.  They oversee a territory 
that stretches as far as the Horsburgh Lighthouse in the east to the Sultan Shoal in the 
west, Raffles Lighthouse in the south to the narrow Johor Strait in the north [6].  The 
PCG and RSN have integrated their operational responses since 1993.  Both agencies 
work alongside each other to combat and deter sea robbery, piracy and hijack.  This co-
2ordinated approach has not experienced a single case of sea robbery in Singapore waters 
since July 1990. [8] 
Although well guarded by the PCG and RSN, the security of the waters around 
the STW remains tenuous.  The Strait of Malacca has received attention for attacks 
against vessels at sea [9].  This has stemmed from both the strategic location of the Strait 
as an artery for over 50 per cent of international trade and 80 per cent of Japan's oil 
supplies; and for its close proximity to Singapore [9].  However, in terms of relative risk, 
the Strait of Malacca is less dangerous the zone east of Bintan Island.  Bintan and 
neighboring Batam Island, a free-trade zone that is just outside the STW, have long been 
recognized as venues where organized crime syndicates and pirate gangs meet, do 
business and plan major attacks [9].  In these waters, shipping tends to concentrate and 
slow as it approaches the Strait of Singapore, presenting what one intelligence official 
described as "sitting ducks" [9]. 
 The kinds of maritime threats and the ways these threats can be executed are 
numerous and unpredictable.  For example, terrorists on a perfectly legitimate cruise liner 
can scuttle it when it is approaching the cruise center, potentially shutting down the 
waterways to the port as well.  It is also possible for terrorists to hijack a vessel and ram it 
against the cruise center, the container terminal or an oil refinery [10]  Another 
possibility is for terrorists to fire rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) or piercing light anti-
tank weapons  at passing oil tankers or refineries from commercial fishing trawlers or 
ferries [11].  Deception and surprise are also tools used by maritime terrorists against 
naval ships.  Even if a naval ship was fitted with long-range guns, a terrorist group can 
conduct a “wolf-pack” attack where a cluster of terrorist craft will simultaneously 
approach a target craft from multiple directions [11].   
The increase in piracy attacks is particularly worrying due to the vulnerability to 
terrorism of Singapore’s strategically important waterway.  Singapore’s defense minister, 
Teo Chee Hean, warned, “the damage could be horrific if terrorists turned supertankers 
… or chemical carriers into floating bombs” [12].  Because the coastal waters around 
Singapore play such a vital role as one of the country’s economic pillars, protection of 
these waterways is imperative. 
3B. EFFORTS TO ENHANCE INTERNATIONAL MARITIME SECURITY 
In November 2001, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) Assembly 
adopted a resolution to develop appropriate measures to enhance maritime security in 
order to preclude a terrorist attack from the sea.  In December 2002, the IMO adopted 
new maritime security measures that included amendments to the 1974 Convention of 
Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS 74) as well as a new mandatory International Ships and 
Port Facilities Security (ISPS) Code [13].  Some of the amendments that have already 
been adopted or extended by the MPA include: 
1. installation of shipboard Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) [14] [15], 
2. equipment of silent ship-to-shore security alert systems [16], 
3. request of information related to ship security that a ship may be required to 
provide prior to entering the port and initial inspection of the ship when in the port [17], 
4. empowering port state control officers to take appropriate measures, including 
delay, restriction of operations, denial of entry or expulsion from port, in response to any 
non-compliance of the requirements of Chapter XI-2 of the SOLAS 74 or the ISPS Code 
[17], 
5. requiring vessels to maintain continuous record of registration, ownership and 
other information that can be used by port control officers to assess any security risk 
posed by a vessel [18], and 
6. extending the ISPS Code to include mandatory compliance by small vessels and 
harbor craft that solely operates within the port limits [19]. 
Singapore has moved to meet this threat to national security.  Besides seeking to 
improve port security, the Singapore government has also instituted a range of new 
measures, including providing escorts for high-value vessels within its waters and 
conducting special forces training aimed at retaking a hijacked vessel.  In order to 
increase awareness beyond its own waters, Singapore has also hosted a series of 
international conferences and meetings focused on maritime security [9]. 
 
4C. THE OBJECTIVES OF THE SURFACE CONTACT INTENT TRACKING 
SYSTEM FOR HARBOR AND WATERWAYS SECURITY 
How can surface contact intent be modeled in a multi-agent system (MAS) for the 
identification of potentially hostile behaviors and potential threats in ports and 
waterways?  This is the first research question that this thesis hopes to answer.  The three 
main agencies that provide surveillance of the waters around Singapore are the MPA, 
PCG and RSN are focused on different areas and regions so each agency may develop 
different surveillance blind spots.  A composite surveillance picture may help to mitigate 
the effects of the surveillance blind spots for each agency.  Many information and 
intelligence sources contribute to a composite surveillance picture.  Examples of some 
important information sources include the Port Traffic Management System (PTMS) and 
the Vessel Traffic Information System (VTIS) that are used to manage vessel traffic in 
harbors and waterways [20].  Some other information sources may include civilian and 
military sensors, coastal patrols, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), unmanned surface 
vehicles (USVs), spot reports, visual sightings, and general communication reports from 
coastal patrols.  A MAS can produce a common composite surveillance picture of the 
territorial waters about Singapore by compiling and correlating all information sources.   
The second research question for this thesis is: Are the models sufficiently 
realistic to be used as a decision aid in maritime security?  With a monthly record of 
almost 11,000 arrivals of vessels, totaling an upwards of 75 gross tons, into the Port of 
Singapore [4], and many unrecorded smaller leisure and fishing vessels, the number of 
surface contacts presented on a common composite surveillance picture will be 
overwhelming.  It would be very difficult for port control officers to be able to identify 
surface contacts with mischievous or potentially hostile intent before they are allowed to 
strike. 
Knowing the identity of surface contacts is insufficient for discovering potential 
incoming threats to civilian or military assets, as in the case of a high-jacked vessel.  The 
MAS performs threat assessment with track attributes and cues that are considered by 
human surface warfare experts, and monitors for suspicious behaviors over time among 
all surface contacts that are within the port and territorial waters of Singapore.  Such 
behaviors may include loitering, violations of international navigation rules, 
5encroachment into restricted areas, aggressive maneuvers and even unusual coordinated 
activities among surface contacts. 
By integrating intelligence and information from as many sources as possible, the 
designer hope the MAS achieves its primary objective: to help the human operator sieve 
through the hundreds of surface contacts by integrating rules, information sources and 
intelligence into surface contact intent models, and immediately highlight when any 
suspicious or potentially hostile surface contacts have been identified.  The system is 
expected also to consider the information provided under the new amendments to the 
SOLAS convention [13].  These include the shipboard AIS and security alert system, 
declaration of security and security logs, registries of vessel registration, vessel 
ownership, cargo manifests, and vessel transit schedules. 
 
D. SCOPE OF THE CURRENT STUDY 
Detection of low observables such as small leisure and fishing vessel is a problem 
in the maritime domain even with the most advance maritime sensor technology.  
Although the MAS will not be concerned with solving this problem, the ability of the 
MAS to identify the intention of tracks by consolidating available and incomplete 
information will be helpful in highlighting suspect low observables.  Emerging profiles of 
interest require further investigation by other resources such as UAVs, USVs or coastal 
patrols. 
Upon identifying potential threats, the system immediately alerts users of the 
system such as vessel traffic controllers, possibly from the MPA, at the Vessel Traffic 
Center.  Follow-on decisions, like alerting higher authorities or raising a warning to the 
public, lie with the user.  The processes involved in deciding countermeasures to tackle a 
threat once it has been identified are beyond the scope of this system. 
 
6E. RELATED WORK IN OTHER THREAT INTENT IDENTIFICATION 
SYSTEMS 
The MAS is partly inspired by the work done by Ozkan [21] in the autonomous 
agent-based simulation system for air-threat assessment.  This work incorporated the idea 
of conceptual blending [22], together with the research of Amori [23] and Liebhaber [29] 
in airborne threat assessment, to build a model that is capable of predicting the intent of 
air tracks.  Besides predicting track intent, the system is also able to identify coordinated 
activities between air tracks.  The idea and mechanisms for conceptual blending will be 
covered in more detail in Chapter II.  Similarly, the MAS also incorporate ideas from 
Liebhaber’s preliminary research in surface warfare threat assessment [30] which is 
described in more details in Chapter II as well. 
Chapter III describes in detail the architecture of the compound MAS developed 
for tracking the intent of surface contacts moving in harbors and waterways.  The agents 
use basic track data and conceptual blending operations to infer more information about a 
track.  Intent models use the track information to compute the current intent of a surface 
contact.  Chapter IV describes the mock VTS-C2 (Vessel Traffic Service-C2) system that 
is developed to test the MAS against scenarios incorporating hostility that may exist in a 
harbor and surrounding waterways.  Experts in the domain of surface warfare threat 
assessment and harbor security evaluate the system.  The results are presented in Chapter 
IV.  Chapter V concludes the thesis by discussing recommendations and suggestions for 
improving the MAS.  
7II. THEORY BACKGROUND 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will provide a background into the human decision making process 
in real-life situations under stress of time and resources.  This will be followed by a 
discussion of threat assessment processes that has been used by experts in the military.  
Several multi-agent models for threat assessment will be presented, including a multi-
agent system that uses conceptual blending which is a novel theory about how humans 
rationalize the events that are happening around them. 
 
B NATURALISTIC DECISION MAKING 
Traditional decision research has focused on only one part of decision making, 
referred to as the decision event, where an individual makes a choice after considering a 
known and fixed set of alternatives and weighing the likely consequences of each 
available choice [24].  However, research [25] into the naturalistic decision making 
(NDM) process of fireground commanders in real-life situations showed that the decision 
event model does not correspond with how the commanders actually make decisions.  
Instead of making choices, considering alternatives or assessing probabilities, the 
commanders acted and reacted based on prior experience, generating, monitoring and 
modifying plans to meet the needs of the situations. 
Most NDM models are characterized by a process that involves matching the 
pattern of a situation to sets of actions, and then selecting and evaluating an action with 
respect to goals and plans.  Table 1 shows eight important factors characterize the 
settings of these NDM models.  Though it is not necessary that all eight factors be 
significantly present in the same setting, it is the combination of several of these factors 
that will complicate the decision task in a realistic setting [24]. 
 
81. Ill-structured problems 
2. Uncertain dynamic environments 
3. Shifting, ill-defined, or competing goals 
4. Action/feedback loops may help the decision maker generate 
corrective actions or adjust their plans based on early mistakes 
5. Significant time pressure on the decision maker 
6. High stakes on the outcomes of the decisions made 
7. Multiple players involved in the decision making process 
8. Organizational goals and norms that guides the decision maker 
 
Table 1. Important factors in NDM models 
 
C. THE RECOGNITION-PRIMED DECISION MODEL 
One study of command-and-control performance led to the Recognition-Primed 
Decision (RPD) model of rapid decision making that explains how decisions are made by 
experts without having to compare all options.  The RPD appears to be used for up to 
96% of expert decisions [27].  Figure 1.   presents a complex RPD model that fuses two 
processes: situation assessment and mental simulation. 
A recognition strategy for situational assessment is used by an expert decision 
maker in a changing situation.  These include plausible goals that can be achieved, 
critical cues from the observed situation, expectations about tasks and outcomes that can 
be accomplished within a limited time, and finally the generation of an obvious course of 
action.  Mental simulation, also known as imagery, is next used to evaluate the course of 
action.  The evaluation may reveal flaws that need modification or inadequacies in an 
option that can be rejected and the next most typical course of action is used [25]. 
 
9D. THREAT ASSESSMENT 
Situation awareness, as defined by Endsley [28], is the state of knowledge 
achieved by “the perception of the elements in the environment, the comprehension of 
their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future.”  Within the 
framework of NDM, it appears that the processes of threat assessment and situation 
awareness share many common elements and that threat assessment may be an instance 
of situation assessment [29]. 
 
 
Figure 1.   A complex RPD model (From Ref: 27) 
 
The study in airborne threat assessment by Liebhaber and Smith [29] offered an 
insight into the process of building situation awareness by expert Air Defense officers.  
Results from their research suggested that threat assessment is an evaluation process that 
compares the degree of fit between input data and the expected data values based on 
profiles (schemas), as shown in Figure 2.  This is similar to situation assessment in the 
NDM framework. Profiles are used to organize and evaluate information, to make 
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judgments.  It is found that when data atypical of a profile is found, the experts will 
attempt to provide explanation for the inconsistencies with the profile rather than change 
profiles. 
The profiles in airborne threat assessment are schemas that specify the expected 
behaviors of a class of aircraft.  The air defense experts use these profiles to evaluate 
track data about an aircraft.  Up to 22 major factors are used in these profiles, including 
electromagnetic signal emissions, Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) values, origin, speed, 
altitude, intelligence reports, and weapon envelope.  Every profile consists of a subset of 
these factors and a corresponding set of expected data values.  The expected data may be 
in the form of a range of values, or as threshold values. 
An evaluation process compares the degree of fit between input data and the 
expected values based on the profiles.  The resulting threat level of an aircraft depends on 
the evaluated degree of match between expected and actual input data values.  The threat 
level increases as the degree of cognitive dissonance increases.  There is evidence of 
geopolitical situation bias playing an indirect role of deciding the threat level in the threat 
assessment process [29].  The bias modifies the range of acceptable input values and 
reduces the tolerance for deviations from expected behaviors.  The reduced tolerance for 
deviation led to more mismatches which in turn resulted in higher threat levels being 
reported. 
Using similar data collection process and algorithm development, Liebhaber and 
Feher has conducted a preliminary investigation of cues that experienced surface warfare 
personnel use to evaluate the threat level of nearby surface ships in both littoral and open 
sea environments [30].  The objectives of the investigation were to: 
1. find the level of threat associated with different types of ships, 
2. identify the relationship between specific values of cues and the corresponding 
perception of threat, 
3. rank the cues in order of importance or relevance to threat assessment, and 




Figure 2.   Cognitive-based Model of Threat Assessment (From Ref: 29) 
 
Initial threat levels are established from a set of categories that includes (non-
exhaustive) origin, ship structure, and type of military or commercial vessels, as shown in 
Table 2. 
 




1. Type 1 
2. Type 2 
3. Type 3 
1. Carrier 
2. Patrol/Escort 
3. Service Craft 






Table 2. Categories used to establish initial threat level 
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After categorizing the vessel, the cognitive model assigns threat level change 
ratings (TCRs) to these baseline threat levels from 15 environment and track data.  The 
cues are ranked in relative importance to the assessment of threat.  A TCR describes the 
relationship between the cued data and the perceived changes to the baseline threat levels 
with a magnitude of change.  A positive TCR represents a rise in threat level while a 
negative TCR will result in a fall in threat level.  Table 3 summarizes some of the TCRs 
used. 
1. Speed 
2. Course/Heading from Own-Ship 
3. Closest Point of Approach (CPA) 
4. Recent maneuvers/history 
5. Electronic Support Measures (ESM)/Radar Emitter 
6. Voice communication with track 
7. Range/Distance from Own-Ship 
8. On/Near Sea Lane/Traffic Lane 
9. Destination of track 
10 Potential or Known Weapon Envelope of track 
11. Regional Intelligence 
12. Coordinated Activity 
 
Table 3. Threat Level Change Ratings 
 
Finally, the model derives a rule-based surface threat algorithm based on a set of 
empirical and observational studies on naval air threat assessment by Air Defense officers 
in the earlier study [30]. 
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E. CONCEPTUAL BLENDING 
Conceptual Blending, proposed by Fauconnier and Turner, is a theory about how 
humans process the information coming from the environment and how humans 
rationalize the events happening around them.  The theory of conceptual blending, also 
known as conceptual integration, is one possible explanation of how humans think: give 
meaning to external information and events, integrate the information, and eventually 
learn and gain experience.  The key process in the theory is blending; humans are 
unconsciously but constantly blending when talking, listening, imagining and in every 
other aspect of human life [22]. 
Blending is a set of mental operations for combining cognitive models in a 
network of discrete mental spaces.  Mental spaces are small conceptual packets 
constructed as we think and talk for the purpose of understanding and action.  Mental 
spaces are connected to long-term schematic knowledge called “frames” such as the 
frame of sailing along a ferry route or inside a maritime traffic separation scheme (TSS), 
and to long-term specific knowledge such as a memory of an event such as past track 
incursions into Area-To-Be-Avoided (ATBA) zones.  Within the mental spaces are 
elements of these types of knowledge that are structured by frames.  Mental spaces are 
interconnected in working memory which can be modified dynamically and they can be 
used to model dynamic mappings in thought and language [22]. 
Building a conceptual integration network involves setting up several mental 
spaces [22].  A minimal integration network is shown in Figure 3.  The network is 
comprised of several components:  
1. Two input mental spaces, represented by circles, with cross-space mapping, 
represented by the solid lines, to connect counterparts in these input mental spaces. 
2. A generic mental space that captures the structure that input spaces share which is 
in turn map onto, represented by the dotted lines, each of the input i.e. a given element in 
the generic space maps onto paired counterparts in the input spaces. 
3. The blended space, or just simply called “the blend”, is the mental space onto 
which, during blending, the structure from the input mental spaces, indicated by the 
dotted lines, is projected.  However not all elements and relations from the input spaces 
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are projected into the blend.  Generic spaces are used together with the generic structures 
they contain to guide the selective projection of elements from the input spaces into 
blended spaces.  The blended spaces will contain more specific structures, based on 
information from the input mental spaces. 
4. In the blend, emergent structure, represented by the solid square in the blended 
space, may arise in the blend but not exist in any of the mental spaces.  It can be 
generated in three ways:  
i. through composition of projections from the inputs [22], 
ii. through completion based on independently recruited frames and scenarios 
[22], and  
iii. through elaboration (“running the blend”) i.e. treating the blends like 
mental simulations that run according to the principles that have been 
established for the blend [22]. 
 
 
Figure 3.   A Basic Conceptual Integration Network 
 
The new blended space, together with its emergent structure can next participate 
as an input space of another similar minimal network.  Any mental space can participate 
Blend
Generic Space 
Input Space 1 Input Space 2 
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in multiple networks.  Complex integration networks, as shown in Figure 4.  , can be built 
with arrays of mental spaces connected through blending operations.  These integration 
networks have coherent structures that represent the way human think and make meaning 
of their environment. 
 
 
Figure 4.   Complex integration networks (From Ref: 21) 
 
A critical aspect of conceptual blending is not the blend but rather the finding of 
relations (the solid lines) between the mental spaces that leads to the blend.  The theory 
calls these all-important relations “vital relations”.  The links between input mental 
spaces, known as “outer-space” links can be compressed into relations, known as “inner-
space” relations, inside the blend itself.  It is this ability to achieve compression through 
blending that give humans “global insight, human-scale understanding and new meaning” 
with efficiency and creativity [22].  Some vital relations identified by the theory are 
shown in Table 4. 
Integration and compression alone is insufficient.  Disintegration and 
decompression, the ability for projections to be made from the blend back onto its 
disintegrated input spaces, are required as well.  The blend has to be connected back to 
the rest of the network.  Human understanding is a matter of activating and connecting 
compressions and decompressions simultaneously in the entire network [22].  There are 
multiple possibilities of compression and decompression, relations among mental spaces, 
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the kinds of projection and emergence.  This leads to a large variety of integration 
networks. 
 
Change Identity Time Space 
Cause-Effect Part-Whole Representation Role 
Property Intentionality Similarity Uniqueness 
 
Table 4. Vital Relations 
 
F. MULTIAGENT SYSTEM FOR ADVERSARIAL PLAN RECOGNITION 
In high-threat situations, tactical decision makers must analyze large volumes of 
data from external sensors and other sources simultaneously and quickly.  This is 
necessary in order to correctly assess the enemy intentions and decisions can then be 
made in within short periods of time.  The studies on threat assessment in the domains of 
naval air defense and surface warfare have revealed that a large number of factors will 
have to be considered by the decision makers [29] [30].  As the adversary may act singly 
or in concert, the tactical decision maker must also possess knowledge of a broad array of 
choices from among the adversary’s potential tactical patterns.  This problem is 
exacerbated by information “gaps” due to sensor inadequacies and misinformation 
subject to enemy deception [23]. 
The Plan Recognition for Airborne Threats (PRAT) system [23] by Amori can 
perform adversarial plan recognition for airborne using a multi-agent architecture derived 
from plan-based natural language understanding.  The architecture is comprised of single 
agents used for reasoning about the intentions of individual adversaries.  Each individual 
agent contains two components, a backward component and a forward component.  Track 
data are stored in “rolling” or dynamic-content data structures in the backward 
component.  The forward component for reasoning uses these data structures for 
reasoning about the intention of a track and the result is stored in similar data structures 
as well.  As the scenario changes, the track data in the backward component is updated 
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regularly.  The forward component changes its hypotheses about the track dynamically 
over time as well as new evidence becomes available. 
The architecture also contains sets of agents that are grouped together when the 
tracks they represent are suspected of acting in possible coordinated attacks.  Similar to 
the individual agents, each agent in these groups also contains the same backward and 
forward components.  In this case, the forward component stores the result of reasoning 
on group behavior among these cooperating agents.  The PRAT system is able to perform 
complicated 3-dimensional and temporal reasoning under real-time requirements.  Using 
a divide-and-conquer strategy, the system blends high volumes of sensor data with agent 
behavioral characteristics and tactical doctrines in order to infer adversarial plans [23]. 
 
G. MULTIAGENT SYSTEM FOR THREAT ASSESSMENT 
A different multi-agent architecture for threat assessment, fusing a sense-update-
act agent operation paradigm together with elements of cognitive blending theory, was 
described by Ozkan [21].  A basic Sense-Update-Act agent architecture, proposed by 
Susanne Barber from the University of Texas, is shown in Figure 5.  The basic agent in 
this architecture is embedded in an environment from which it receives sensory inputs 
through a sensory pathway.  Changes to the state of the environment are achieved 
through a behavior actuator channel. 
The functionality and organization of this architecture was further refined by John 
Hiles in his project on Integrated Asymmetric Goal Assessment (IAGO) at the Naval 
Postgraduate School [31].  The expanded architecture subsumes multiple agents within an 
external environment, shown in Figure 6.  There are several possible types of agents in 
this architecture. 
 
1. Reactive Agents 
These are simple agents that act as transducers that translate input data or signals 
from the environment into control or data signals that are sent back into the environment.  
They do not retain state information or use sophisticated internal cognitive models for 
their tasks [31]. 
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2. Cognitive Agents 
These agents maintains internal state information and models for their processing.  
This allows them to act in conjunction to historical data and past conclusions so their 
behaviors may change over time.  These agents are able to formulate goals, incrementally 
collect information over time in order to prove or refute these goals, and then act 
according to their results.  Their state knowledge can be externalized as well so that other 
agents, the environments and even humans may understand what these cognitive agents 
know and why they are behaving in some manner [31]. 
 
3. Composite Agents 
These are specialized instances of cognitive agents that contain internally other 
agents.  The nested agents do not interact directly with the external environment.  Instead 
the internal environment of the containing agent provides these nested or internal agents 
with a localized context for data sets and belief maintenance.  The internal agents are 
typically used to maintain more complex state information and sophisticated cognitive 
models that may include interaction of several internal agents [31]. 
 
4. Families of Agents 
Agents can be further grouped together into homogenous groups where each 
member agent perform the same functions, or into heterogeneous groups with many types 
of member agents.  Research into complex adaptive systems using aggregates of agents 
has shown that these agent groups are able to exhibit synergistic or emergent behaviors.  
As a result of these collective behaviors, insights into very complex systems can be 
obtained [31]. 
Building on this agent architecture and the theory of cognitive blending, an Air 
Defense Laboratory (ADL) simulation was proposed by Ozkan [21] to model the way an 
air-defense officer makes threat assessments.  This research is also part of the Red Team 
Intent project which is a multi-agent system for discerning the intentions of any track 




Figure 5.   The Sense-Update-Act agent architecture (From Ref: 31) 
 
 
Figure 6.   The Generalized Sense-Update-Act agent architecture (From Ref: 31) 
 
The ADL simulation system uses a 3-layer multi-agent architecture shown in 
Figure 7.  The architecture is based on the generalized sense-update-act agent paradigm, 
to predict the identity of air tracks.  In the bottom layer, each track in the simulation has a 
set of reactive agents, each focused on specific different track features and data.  These 
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reactive agents act like localized sensors that receive information from the external 
environment and transmit the information to a predictor agent in the next layer above. 
 
 
Figure 7.   The 3-layer multi-agent architecture of the ADL simulation system 
 
Every predictor agent maintains five competing models for identity prediction: 
Civilian, Unknown, Friendly, Suspect and Hostile.  These cognitive models are 
constantly updated with new information about the track coming up from the bottom 
layer.  Based on past and current the track data, each model will compute a score that 
represents the strength of the identity that it represents.  At any time, the model with the 
highest score will be considered the active model and the identity it represents will be the 
predicted identity for the track. 
There is only one regional agent at the topmost layer that is responsible for 
finding coordinated activities between tracks.  This is done by monitoring for regional 
activities involving more than one track.  The ADL simulation is able to find three types 
of coordinated activity for air tracks: 
1. striker with coordinated snooper-support, 
2. coordinated detachment involving two tracks turning in concert, and 
3. merge activity where two tracks are joining. 
Interaction between the predictor and regional agents is bidirectional.  When a 
track is discovered to be involved in one of the three regional coordinated activities, the 
 Predictor Agents Layer 
Reactive Agents 
Layer
Regional Agent Layer 
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regional agent will report this new insight back to the predictor agent.  The predictor 
agent will use this feedback to reinforce one or more of its nested identity models. 
The ADL simulation uses a combination of conceptual blending and evidence 
weighting algorithm in order to establish a track’s identity.  Fusing track features and 
information is achieved by blending operations, similar to other methods of identity 
estimation involving pattern-recognition based on clustering algorithms, neural networks, 
or decision-based techniques like Bayesian inference or weighted-decision techniques.  
An example of how a coordinated merge activity is shown in Figure 8.  A coordinated 
merge activity can be detected by: 
1. mapping the data of two tracks in the input mental spaces with vital relations (also 
known as Composition), 
2. projection of the relevant data from the input space onto a structure or pattern of a 
merge operation which is specified in a generic space (also known as Completion), and 
3. the compression of the generic structure from the generic space and the specific 
track information and associated vital relations into a blend which represents a merge 
activity between the two tracks. 
 
 
Figure 8.   Merge Detector Blending Operation (From Ref: 21) 
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The identity models are represented as groups of nodes in the resultant integration 
network that is formed by the blending operations.  The nodes are then weighted based on 




Several multi-agent models for threat assessment were presented.  These systems 
apply some of the cognitive processes that human military experts use for making 
decisions under stress.  Among these systems is a multi-agent system (MAS) that uses 
conceptual blending.  This novel theory of human understanding has been applied 
successfully in the domain of air threat assessment.  The idea of using a MAS for threat 
assessment will be applied in the domain of surface contact threat assessment.  The MAS 
will use threat level cues for surface warfare to determine the intent of surface contacts.  
The design of the MAS will be presented in detail in Chapter III. 
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III. DESIGN OF THE MULTI-AGENT SYSTEM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Thus far we have described a compound multi-agent system (MAS) designed for 
surface threat intent identification.  Each surface contact is represented by a track agent 
which has a nested MAS that continuously processes incoming information about the 
contact in order to discover the likely intent of the contact.  Each nested MAS uses track 
data and information of key maritime traffic elements such as Traffic Separation Schemes 
(TSS) and Area-To-Be-Avoided (ATBA) zones.  The MAS also incorporates the threat 
assessment cues that experienced surface warfare personnel use for surface threat 
assessment [30].  This chapter describes the layered hierarchy of agents inside the MAS: 
the different types of agents and their roles, how the agents interact and coordinate to 
generate blends, and how weighted scoring strategies are used to deduce the intent of a 
track. 
 
B. THE CMAS LIBRARY 
The communication and coordination among many different agents in the nested 
MAS is achieved using the Connector-based Multi-agent Simulation Library (CMAS) 
developed by John Hiles and his team at the Naval Postgraduate School [31].  The CMAS 
library has been used in projects such as the US Army game “Soldiers” and Project 
IAGO (Integrated Asymmetric Goal Assessment) [31]. 
The basic elements for agent communication and control within the CMAS 
framework are connectors.  The agents use these connectors to externalize portions of 
their internal states into the multi-agent environment.  Connectors are like plugs and 
receptacles that can be extended or retracted as shown in Figure 9.  Agent 1 can signal to 
the external multi-agent environment two pieces of its internal information by extending 
two connectors known as stimulus connectors.  Meanwhile Agent 2 in the same 
environment has registered its interest in receiving two pieces of the same information by 
extending two response connectors that queries the environment for the information.  
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Signaling and coordination between the two agents occurs when there are matching pairs 
of plug-receptacle connectors and the connectors get connected. 
 
 
Figure 9.   Connectors for agent communication and coordination 
 
The CMAS library also uses the concept of tickets as a mechanism for encoding 
procedural instructions for agents as well as to provide an internal data organizing 
system.  There are two types of tickets – data tickets are used to organize and assess the 
completion status of hierarchical structures, and procedural tickets are used to generate 
appropriate agent behavior in response to the state of another agent’s tickets and 
connectors.  More information about the use of tickets can be found in the “CMAS Users 
Guide” [31].  Currently, the MAS only use connectors for agent communication and 
coordination.  Data structures and agent behavior are currently implemented natively in 
the agents without the use of tickets. 
 
C. THE MULTI-LAYERED ANATOMY OF A TRACK AGENT 
Every surface contact in the MAS is represented by a corresponding track agent.  
Inside every track agent is another nested MAS so the overall system can be considered a 
compound MAS.  The layered agent architecture nested inside every Track agent is 











propagates upwards from the lower layers.  The information may be processed further to 
infer more information about a track and the new information also propagated upwards.  




Figure 10.   The nested MAS inside each Track agent 
 
1. The Layer of Track Data Agents 
The lowest level consists of purely reactive data agents, also known as data 
tickets.  Their primary function is to act like an interface to the outside world and to carry 
information from the outside world into the internal environment of the MAS 
environment where all the other agents reside.  The information provided by the layer of 
track data agents will be used by the cognitive agent layer above.  Table 5 shows the 








































































Data Name Description 
Track Type The type of track.  The possible values are: 
1. Unknown 
2. Police Coast Guard (PCG) 
3. Military 





Position The current position of the track in GEO Lat and 
GEO Long. 






Track Destination Destination of the track.  This is the name of the 
destination that the track is going to. 
Track Heading The current heading of the track in degrees. 
Track Speed The current speed of the track in knots. 
Track Comm The existence of voice communication with the 


















Track ESM The presence of Electronic Support Measures 







Table 5. Track data used by the MAS 
 
2. The Layer of Cognitive Agents 
The cognitive agents use the information provided by the lower level of data 
agents to make inferences to discover if a track is 
1. in a special area like a traffic separation scheme (TSS) or restricted area, and 
2. violating any rules or traveling in a dangerous or atypical manner. 
 
a. The Location Agent 
The Location Agent uses the track’s current position to decide whether the 
track is inside a special area e.g. in a TSS, or inside a restricted zone where rules on track 
type, speed, activity and other track attributes may apply.  This is achieved by 
investigating user-defined locations and sizes of the Traffic Separation Schemes (TSS) 
and restricted zones. 
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b. TSS Heading Violation Agent 
A Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) is a sea-lane with a predefined traffic 
direction that has been designated by a Vessel Traffic Service operating in a harbor.  
Under Rule 10 of the International Navigation Rules formalized by the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) at the Convention on the International Regulations for 
Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972, (72COLREGS), “a track using a traffic separation 
scheme shall proceed in the appropriate traffic lane in the general direction of traffic flow 
for that lane” [34].  If the MAS found a track violating the traffic direction of a TSS, a 
TSS heading violation occurs. 
 
 
Figure 11.   A Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) 
 
c. Speed Violation Agent 
Rule 6 of the 72COLREGS states that “every vessel shall at all times 
proceed at a safe speed so that she can take proper and effective action to avoid collision 
and be stopped within a distance appropriate to the prevailing circumstances and 
conditions” [34].  A TSS may also have minimum and maximum speed limits that tracks 
traveling inside a TSS is expected to comply for prudent seamanship.  There can also be 




or in fishing areas in the surrounding waterways, where there are high traffic density.  A 
speed violation occurs when a track fails to comply with the speed limits defined in these 
areas. 
 
d. Speed Threshold Violation Agent 
Rule 6 of the 72COLREGS also states that safe speed is also related to the 
“maneuverability of the vessel with special reference to stopping distance and turning 
ability” [34].  Besides predefined speed limits for designated areas, the MAS also checks 
for speed limits defined for different track types.  Different track types can have different 
maximum speed limit thresholds that are considered normal for the track types.  If a track 
is found to be traveling at an atypically excessive speed based on its track type, the 
system detects a speed threshold violation. 
 
e. Security Zone Violation Agent 
Cruise-liners, tankers, ferries, military craft are examples of High Value 
Units (HVUs).  The MAS will help monitor for potentially hostile intent against these 
HVUs by encircling them with user-defined security zones [35] [36] as shown in Figure 
12.  Only certain types of pre-defined tracks e.g. police coast guards (PCGs) may be 
allowed within these security zones.  Each security zone is associated with an alert time 
which can be considered as a user-defined time required by a HVU to respond when 
another track encroaches into one of its security zones. 
As HVUs move, the MAS continually monitors the CPA (Closest Point of 
Approach) and TCPA (Time to CPA) of other tracks around it.  When an unauthorized 
track has a CPA that falls within a security zone of a HVU and its TCPA is less than the 
Alert Time defined for the zone, a security zone violation occurs, as shown in Figure 13.  
Security zones can also be defined for static HVUs e.g. military installations, oil 
refineries, ferry terminals that may be located near or on the coast.  Similarly, a security 
zone violation occurs when an unauthorized track has a CPA inside a security zone and 




Figure 12.   Security Zones around a HVU 
 
 
Figure 13.   Security Zone Violation 
 
f. Area-To-Be-Avoided Violation Agent 
An ATBA is defined by the IMO as “an area that all ships or certain 
classes of ships should avoid because navigation is particularly hazardous or it is 
exceptionally important to avoid casualties within the area [37].“  Areas-To-Be-Avoided 
(ATBAs) may also be defined near restricted areas e.g. oil refineries and military 
installations.  Only certain types of tracks and track activities may be allowed within 
these ATBAs.  The MAS detects an ATBA violation when an unauthorized track intrudes 
into an ATBA. 
 
TCPA = 3min 
CPA
Radius = 0.2nm, Alert Time = 15min
Radius = 0.5nm, Alert Time = 10min
Radius = 0.8nm, Alert Time = 5min
Security Zone Violation
Radius = 0.2nm, 
Alert Time = 15min 
Radius = 0.5nm, 
Alert Time = 10min 
Radius = 0.8nm, 
Alert Time = 5min 
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Figure 14.   An Area-To-Be-Avoided 
 
3. Track Violations and Cognitive Blending Operations 
A track violation is discovered by a Violation agent through the integration of 
track data, rules and regulations of the VTS and other user-defined information using 
conceptual blending operations. A track’s CPA and TCPA from an input mental space for 
a track is connected, through Distance and Time Vital Relations, to another input mental 
space representing the definition of a security zone and the corresponding alert time 
around a HVU, as shown in Figure 15.  Note that the input mental space of a track 
contains other information besides CPA and TCPA. 
The generic space is required to guide the selective projection of the relevant 
information into the blended space.  In this case, the generic space is provided by the 
Violation agent.  It contains the rules regarding the conditions that constitute a security 
zone violation. 
The CMAS library provides connector-based (receptacle-plug) agent 
communication to the agents in the MAS environment.  The Security Zone Violation 
agent extends queries (receptacles) into the MAS environment for specific track data that 
is specified in the generic space, as shown in Figure 16.  The relevant track data agents or 
data tickets respond to the queries, if their connectors are extended, by plugging their 
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connectors into the corresponding receptacles and transfer the required information to the 
Violation agent.  Based on the track’s current position, speed and heading, its CPA and 
TCPA to surrounding High Value Units (HVUs) are calculated by the Violation agent. 
 
 
Figure 15.   An example of a Security Zone Violation blend 
 
 
Figure 16.   Using connectors to query for track data 
 
Finally, a blended space representing a security zone violation is formed 
by the inference based, in this case the computed CPA and TCPA, on information 
projected from the input mental spaces.  The Security Zone Violation blend is spawned 
by the Security Zone Violation Agent.  The blend can be considered a simple reactive 
agent.  Another example of how cognitive blending operation is used to detect an ATBA 
Zone Track Activity Violation is shown in Figure 17.  This case generates an ATBA 
Blend
Generic Space
Track High Value Unit (HVU) 
Track CPA 
(Closest Point of Approach)
Security Zone Radius Distance Vital Relation
CPA < Security Zone Radius 
Security Zone Violation
Track TCPA 
(Time to CPA) 
Security Zone Alert TimeTime Vital Relation
TCPA < Security Zone Alert Time 
Allowed Track Types Track Type 













Zone Track Activity Violation blend.  These violation blends, together with other 
violation blends, forms an intermediate layer of simple reactive agents that work with the 
topmost layer of intent agents. 
 
 
Figure 17.   Example of an ATBA Zone Track Activity Violation blend 
 
D. THE ANATOMY OF AN INTENT AGENT 
The top layer of agents of the nested MAS environment inside a track agent 
comprise of Intent agents.  There are four Intent agents: Friendly, Neutral, Potentially 
Hostile, and Unknown.  Each of these Intent agents uses a family of “helper” agents as 
shown in Figure 18.  The intent agents use information provided by agents from the lower 
layers.  This information includes track location, violations, origin, flag, and existence of 
voice communication with the track, among other indicators. 
The family of weighting agents is responsible for obtaining information, using 
connectors provided by the CMAS library, from the lower layers of data agents and 
blends.  Note that there is a one-to-one relationship between a weighting agent and a data 
agent or blend, as shown in Figure 19.  The weighting agents then forward information 
received to a Weighting Strategy.  The Weighting Strategy defines the intent model i.e. 
Friendly, Neutral, Potentially Hostile, Unknown, that the Intent agent represents.  The 





Allowed Activity Type 
Activity Vital 
Track Activity ≠ Allowed Activity Type 
ATBA Zone Track Activity Violation 
Activity Vital Relation
Location Vital Relation
Track Location Zone Name 
Track Location = Zone Name
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the Weighting agents receive, similar to the Threat Level Change Ratings scheme 




Figure 18.   The nested MAS inside each Intent agent 
 
The Weighting Strategy associated with each Intent model has a unique set of 
weights.  When new information about a track is available from the Weighting agents, all 
the Weighting Strategies compute a revised score using its own set of weights for the new 
information.  Effectively, the Intent models compete, and the one with the highest score 
represents the current intent of the track. 
 



























Figure 19.   Interaction between the weighting agents and other agents 
 
E. THE REGIONAL AGENT LAYER 
Looking from outside the MAS environment of a track agent, a track agent 
appears as a single agent that exists in another external MAS environment.  In this 
external MAS environment, there is a layer of regional agents that monitor the behavior 
of all the track agents, as shown in Figure 20.  Currently, two types of regional agents 
detect coordinated behavior that resembles an impending swarm or a “wolf-pack” (a 
common maritime terrorist tactic [10]) attack on another track or against a restricted 
location such as an oil refinery or a military installation.  Swarm Detection agents 
compare the Security Zone Violation blends generated by the track agents.  If there are 
several similar violation blends by different tracks against another track or location, the 
regional agent produces a Swarm Detection blend, shown in Figure 21.  This blend 
signals the weighting strategies of the track agents suspected of participating in a 
coordinated attack.  The weighting strategies then use the new information to revise the 















Figure 20.   MAS environment of regional and track agents 
 
 
Figure 21.   Example of an Swarm Detection Blend 
 
F. THE USE OF REGIONAL INTELLIGENCE 
The Department of Homeland Security in the United States has developed the 
Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) to inform local decision makers of threat 
condition in the country.  The higher the HSAS threat level the greater the risk of terrorist 
attacks.  The US Coast Guard (USCG) has enacted a similar threat advisory system [38].  
The USCG sets Maritime Security Levels (MARSEC) that corresponds to the HSAS 
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protective system [38].  Table 6 shows the HSAS threat conditions and the corresponding 
MARSEC levels. 
 
Threat Level Homeland Security Advisory 
System (HSAS) Threat 
Conditions 






High Orange MARSEC 2 
Severe Red MARSEC 3 
 
Table 6. HSAS threat conditions and the corresponding MARSEC levels 
 
The MAS also supports a similar 5-level system.  By defining a threat level for 
the MAS, a MARSEC weighting agent inside every track agent heightens or lowers the 
alertness of the system by causing the weighting strategies to apply appropriate biases to 
the intent agents. 
 
G. CONCLUSION 
The compound MAS design, discussed in this chapter, enables computation of 
track intent.  Inside the compound MAS, there are several families of agents working in 
tandem.  Track data agents extract data from the external world and make the data 
available inside the MAS environment.  Cognitive agents then process and blend the data.  
Revised track information or blends representing track violations are then relayed 
upwards into a weighting strategy that exists inside every Intent agent via a layer of 
weighting agents.  The different strategies then use their respective sets of weights to 
compute a score for the intent model that they represent.  The intent model with the 
highest score represents the current intent of the track. 
For verification purposes, the compound MAS is integrated into a mock VTS-C2 
simulation system, enabling assessment of various scenarios incorporating hostility that 
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may exist in a harbor or surrounding waterways.  The intent models are evaluated for 
their effectiveness and the results of the tests will be presented in the following chapter. 
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IV. VERIFICATION, VALIDATION, AND EXPERIMENTATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
To test its effectiveness, the compound MAS, described in Chapter Three, was 
integrated into a mock VTS-C2 system.  This chapter presents the VTS-C2 system with 
several scenarios involving many tracks, some exhibiting potentially hostile intent, in an 
effort to validate the MAS on its performance in these scenarios as observed by maritime 
domain experts. 
 
B. THE VTS-C2 MAS 
 
 
Figure 22.   The VTS-C2 MAS 
 
Java-based, the VTS-C2 system supports display of georectified maps, tactical 
overlays and symbol drawing, and graphical and tabular information displays of C2 
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information.  The system also shows the graphic tracks representing surface contacts, 
together with traffic separation schemes and restricted areas that are defined in the area of 
interest.  The graphic tracks are colored according to the current intent of the surface 
contacts.  A screen snapshot of the mock VTS-C2 with the integrated MAS is shown in 
Figure 22.   
The compound MAS is the heart of the entire system.  It uses information on 
speed limits, security zone definitions, ATBA definitions, TSS definitions and the current 
MARSEC level setting.  This information is pre-defined in the system using several setup 
information tables.  One such table for defining the security zones around HVUs is 
shown in Figure 24.  The system architecture of the mock VTS-C2 MAS is shown in 
Figure 23.   
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The system connects to external information sources such as the ship-borne 
Automatic Identification System (AIS) for track information such as track type, track 
flag, origin, and destination.  The system also uses near real-time information about the 




Figure 24.   Pre-defined security zone information setup screen 
 
The user can also specify the weight used by the various weighting strategies 
using one of several weight tables shown in Figure 25.  This weight tables also include 
the bias settings, based on the MARSEC level setting, which the weighting strategies 
apply on the weights.  The values of the weights and biases underlie the weighted scores 
computed by the competing intent models and therefore predicate the deduced intent of 




Figure 25.   Weights and biases setup screen 
 
It is also possible to set additional agent threshold parameters that the cognitive 
agents use to detect security zone violations and coordinated attacks, as shown in Figure 
26.  This allows for some fine-tuning on the frequency and quantity of the violation 
blends produced by the cognitive agents.  The MAS reports computed intents of surface 
contacts through intent score graphs, shown in Figure 27.  The user is also able to get 
more information on how the scores are computed through a corresponding set of tables 
shown in Figure 28.  The top table shows aggregated weighted scores of the intent 
models within track agents representing each surface contact and the bottom table shows 
the breakdown of the aggregate scores into score updates and the reasons for the updates.  
These detailed breakdowns represent important decompressions of integration networks 
comprising of information spaces of different entities (tracks, TSSes, ATBAs, security 
zones) and blends produced by the cognitive agents.  This feature of the MAS helps the 




Figure 26.   Agent threshold parameters setup screen 
 
 




Figure 28.   Breakdown of aggregated intent score 
 
The mock VTS-C2 system also has an integrated Discrete Event Simulation 
(DES) simulator.  The DES simulator uses Simkit, a Java-based software package for 
implementing DES models [39].  In a simulation, every track is represented by a “mover” 
entity which is an object that can change its position over time.  Sensor entities 
representing each TSS and restricted area are used to detect these moving tracks.  If a 
track is a HVU, it will be attached with security zone sensors, the attributes of which are 
defined in the HVU security zone information table.  As the tracks move, their position is 
sent to the track agents in the MAS.  When a track is detected by any of the sensors, the 
corresponding track agent is informed that the track has entered the restricted area or 
security zone represented by the detecting sensor. 
 
C. VALIDATING THE MAS 
The value system design approach, a formulation process of a systems 
engineering effort, provides the basis for a structured and objective evaluation of the 
MAS.  The idea behind this approach is that, by developing objectives and formulating 
them into objective hierarchies or trees, it is possible for stakeholders of the system to 
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appraise the objectives by determining the value gained from achieving them [40].  
Principle stakeholders include future operators and decision makers of a system.  Another 
important use of the objectives tree is that it helps to define and develop quantifiable 
objective metrics or criteria that can be used to measure the success in achieving the 
objectives of the system.  An objectives hierarchy for the MAS is shown in Table 7. 
 
 Goal 
 Tracking the intent of surface contacts for the purpose of threat 
identification in busy ports and waterways  
 Objectives 
1.0 To help the human operator monitor high volume traffic conditions in the 
port and surrounding waterways 
1.1 To monitor multiple surface contacts of all types (PCG, military, cruise 
liners, leisure, tankers, fishing, oiler) 
1.2 To monitor multiple security zones of HVUs (High Value Units) (cruise 
liners, tankers) 
1.3 To monitor restricted areas (oil refineries, cruise center, military 
installations) 
2.0 To monitor that vessels comply with the safety and security rules of the 
port and waterways 
2.1 To check for current track violations 
2.1.1 Current incursions into the security zones of HVUs (cruise liners, 
tankers) 
2.1.2 To check for current incursions into restricted areas (cruise center, oil 
refineries, military installations) 
2.1.3 To check for illegal track types/activities in restricted areas 
2.1.3.1 Fishing in a non-fishing zone 
2.1.3.2 Illegal track type in an Area To Be Avoided (ATBA) 
2.1.4 To check for Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) violations 
2.1.4.1 Traveling against traffic direction 
2.1.4.2 Stopping in a traffic lane 
2.1.4.3 Stopping in a TSS termination zone 
2.1.5 To check for speed violations in restricted areas 
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 Objectives 
2.1.5.1 Speed violation in a harbor 
2.1.5.2 Speed violations in a traffic lane 
2.1.6 To check for Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) violations 
2.1.6.1 Collision detection 
2.2 To check for future track violations 
2.2.1 To check for future incursions into the security zones of HVUs (cruise 
liners, tankers) using Closest Point of Approach (CPA) and Time to CPA 
2.2.2 To check for future incursions into restricted areas (cruise center, oil 
refineries, military installations) 
3.0 To help the decision maker identify suspicious or potentially hostile 
surface contacts 
3.1 To find atypical track behaviors 
3.1.1 To check for excessive speed based on track types (fishing, leisure) 
3.1.2 To check for excessive number of track violations 
3.1.3 To detect participation in coordinated attacks 
3.1.3.1 To detect coordinated attack (swarm/”wolf-pack”) on a HVU/restricted 
area 
3.2 To determine threat level posed by surface contact 
3.2.1 To perform surface threat assessment based on track’s attributes e.g. 
platform, flag, origin, ESM 
3.2.1.1 Threat assessment based on Track Type 
3.2.1.2 Threat assessment based on Track Flag 
3.2.1.3 Threat assessment based on Track Origin 
3.2.1.4 Threat assessment based on Track Destination 
3.2.1.5 Threat assessment based on Track ESM (Unknown, No emitter, I-Band, 
X-Band, Others) 
3.2.1.6 Threat assessment based on Voice Communication with Track(Yes, No) 
3.3 To adapt to the needs of the decision maker 
3.3.1 To provide user-defined biases (weights) 
3.3.2 To incorporate regional intelligence (5 x MARSEC levels) biases 
 
Table 7. Objectives hierarchy of the MAS 
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Four validation sessions with four groups of surface warfare and naval officers 
from the Republic of Singapore Navy and US Navy indicated the impressions these 
operators and decision makers held for the MAS.  Their experiences summed over more 
than 100 years of harbor security, at-sea and patrol experience between them.  Each 
session featured a brief on the features of the MAS and the mock VTS-C2 system.  Next, 
the participants observed several DES simulations on scenarios involving the port of 
Singapore and the surrounding waterways.  Each scenario featured multiple surface 
contacts of different types, moving in an area populated with traffic separation schemes 
and restricted areas and depicted different kinds of hostilities that may exist. The 
participants received no details in advance. 
As the simulations progressed, the participants observed how the MAS determine 
the intent of the surface contacts.  An example of a scenario on a TSS violation and 
impending collision between a leisure craft and a cruise liner is shown in Figure 29.  
Another example of a scenario on a coordinated attack on an oil refinery is shown in 
Figure 30.  At the end of each validation session, the participants completed the 
questionnaire shown in Appendix A. 
 
Figure 29.   A scenario on an impending collision 
TSS violation (speed and heading) 
and an impending collision between a 




Figure 30.   A scenario on a coordinated attack 
 
D. VALIDATION RESULTS 
The general consensus among the participants of the validation session is that the 
MAS is a great advancement in decision aids using compound MAS [49] and can be a 
very useful system for monitoring movement in busy ports and waterways and being 
alerted to potentially hostile activity.  They agreed on the importance of monitoring all 
surface contacts, security zones of HVUs and restricted areas.  This face validation by 
potential stakeholders confirmed that the system meets its first main objective of helping 
the human operator monitor high volume traffic conditions.  However, there are also 
concerns that despite the large amount of information that the system is able to process, 
there will still be an overwhelming information glut [47].  The human operator also needs 
to be well trained to use the system effectively [46].  These issues focus on the operator 
interface more than the processing done by the MAS itself. 
With regards to the second main objective of monitoring that vessels comply with 
the safety and security rules of the port and waterways, the domain experts agreed that 
Possible coordinated attack by 
two fishing vessels on SZone3 
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the MAS met this requirement satisfactory.  However, the possible number of false 
alarms that may arise during heavy traffic conditions in the Port of Singapore may be 
compounded by clutter caused by non-moving surface contacts located in many areas in 
the congested harbor [44] [45] [48].  However, it is important to note that false alarms are 
better than no alarms [46].  The domain experts suggest that the weights used by the 
system have to be calibrated carefully in order to mitigate the number of false alarms. 
The domain experts also agree that with respect to the third main objective, the 
system is a good “proof of concept” that demonstrates how a decision support tool can 
help the decision maker identify suspicious or potentially hostile surface contacts [44].  It 
is important to note that system performance is highly dependent on the quality of 
information and intelligence.  This point was made by some domain experts during the 
validation sessions [46] [47].  The system needs to incorporate specific regional 
intelligence based on track attributes (e.g. track type, origin and activity) and historical 
data (e.g. piracy reports). 
It is also important to assess the accuracy and reliability of information sources if 
the MAS was to become an operational system.  Although the MAS uses information that 
may be obtained automatically from the ship-borne Automatic Identification System 
(AIS), it may also be important to explicitly consider how to interpret the presence or 
absence of an AIS with respect to the threat level posed by a surface contact [48].  There 
are also comments raised by the participants from the Republic of Singapore over the 
semantics of the intent classification labels.  Classification of the intent of a surface 
contact as a “potentially hostile” has certain implications according to their operation 
doctrine [41] [42] [43].  This issue needs to be considered if the MAS was to be 
integrated into an existing command and control system. 
 
E. CONCLUSION 
The mock VTS-C2 simulation system is built for validating the compound MAS.  
A DES simulator is also integrated into the VTS-C2 and it is used to simulate various 
scenarios incorporating hostility that may exist in a harbor or surrounding waterways.  
Several validation sessions are conducted with domain experts from the both the 
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Republic of Singapore Navy and the US Navy.  The MAS and the intent models are 
evaluated for their effectiveness in meeting the objectives of the system.  Apart from 
some minor concerns over finer details, results from the validation sessions shows that 
the MAS is a promising decision support tool that can be used in the maritime security of 
the Port of Singapore. 
After summarizing the work done and findings of the thesis, the next chapter 
presents some key recommendations on future enhancements to the MAS that are 
obtained from the domain experts during the validation sessions. 
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
A. SUMMARY 
Maritime security is especially critical for countries like Singapore, an island 
nation situated on the southern end of the Malacca Strait, the conduit for 50,000 ships a 
year, carrying a third of the world's commerce and half of its crude oil [50].  Singapore’s 
economic prosperity is highly dependent on international trade its her busy port, 
transshipping container terminals, petrochemical complexes, and other high value units 
located along her coastline.  Despite the global decline in the number of reported piracy 
attacks, the number of attacks in the nearby Malacca Strait has increased with evidence 
that many have been the work of terrorist organizations from surrounding countries [50].  
Singapore's defense minister, Dr Tony Tan has expressed concern these attacks may be 
practice runs for a terrorist attack.  Terrorists may now be learning to be pirates, just as 
terrorists learned to be pilots for 9/11 [50]. 
The thesis borrows the ideas and techniques suggested for identifying air threats 
in the Air Defense Laboratory (ADL) and employ them to identify asymmetric maritime 
threats in ports and waterways.  The four intent models of surface contacts developed for 
this system - Friend, Neutral, Unknown, and Potentially Hostile, are taken from attributes 
obtained from VTS manuals, international and inland maritime navigation rules, surface 
threat assessment requirements reports and known terrorist tactics.  Currently these 
models use the following information to identify hostility and potential: 
1. the movement and communication protocols used by vessels registered with the 
Vessel Traffic Systems (VTS) used in ports and waterways, and 
2. a list of surface warfare threat assessment cues that are used by experienced 
surface warfare officers. 
Each surface contact is monitored by a track agent in a compound multi-agent 
system.  Each track agent contains a nested multi-agent system that comprise of the four 
intent models.  The agents communicate and coordinate with a connector-based 
mechanism provided by the CMAS library.  The underlying cognitive mechanism for the 
intent models is conceptual blending.  The theory of conceptual blending is one possible 
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explanation of how humans are able to think: giving meanings to external information 
and events, compressing the information into integration networks and eventually 
learning and gaining experience. 
This study used a mock VTS for the Port of Singapore, the waterways and 
shipping routes around Singapore and included discrete-event simulations of scenarios 
with maritime hostilities to test the system’s ability to identify the intent of multiple 
simulated surface contacts by blending data and information into integration networks.  
The intent identification process of a surface contact used by the compound MAS can be 
obtained through the expansion of the integration networks. 
Domain experts provided face validation and constructive feedback.  Although 
the system requires further fine-tuning and verification, the general consensus among the 
experts is that the MAS has satisfactory address some of the important issues in harbor 
security and the system has the potential of becoming a useful decision support tool. 
 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Before the MAS can be used as a decision support tool, it needs to be verified that 
the MAS works well against real-world traffic situation in the waters of Singapore.  The 
MAS can also be tested during maritime security drills conducted by the military or 
Police Coast Guards (PCG).  Objective measures for verifying system performance may 
include the: 
1. number of Type I errors (false negatives),  
2. number of Type II errors (false positives),  
3. time taken by system to identify hostilities compared to a decision maker, 
4. amount of lead time the system is able to provide in situations of impending 
hostilities, and  
5. number of factors that the system can process as compared to a human operator. 
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The MAS can also be further enhanced with the ability to detect more atypical 
track behaviors or maneuvers such as 
1. excessive zig-zag track movement, 
2. concealment or evasion from Police Coast Guards (PCG)/Military Patrols, 
3. suspicious course changes by monitoring for course/heading of a track in more 
detail (e.g. in terms of Steady and closing/opening or Turn to closing/opening) to 
discover if the track is changing its course frequently to match the movement of a nearby 
HVU, 
4. more coordinated activities between tracks e.g. simultaneous attacks on multiple 
HVUs or restricted areas, and 
5. additional VTS violations e.g. failure to submit Offshore Advance reports, 
wrong/unknown destination. 
A noted drawback of the current system is that once a track has been considered 
as potentially hostile, the system will not modify its designation of the track’s intent i.e. 
the system will neither forgive nor forget the track’s behaviors and violations.  A future 
enhancement can have the system use a decaying intent weighting strategy that allows the 
gradual readjustment of track designations over time [48] [49]. 
The agents in the current MAS are considered “passive” consumers of 
information that is fed into the system.  It is possible and also important, based on 
feedback from the validation sessions, that agents can be proactive in automatically 
searching for more track information i.e. form a paper trail from information sources such 
as database of ship registration, sail plans, Offshore Advance reports, recent inspections 
or boardings, cargo/passenger manifests etc.  The system can also use context-specific 




The primary focus for this thesis is the development of possible surface contact 
intent models that is useful in threat identification for maritime security.  The work done 
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in this thesis is timely given the increased focus on global maritime surveillance and 
Maritime Homeland Protection (MHP) of the US [51] and the priorities placed on global 
maritime intelligence integration and global awareness of civil maritime activities by the 
Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI) [52].  Preliminary validation results of the four 
intent models are very encouraging and the models can be refined and be integrated into 
an existing decision support system or be the basis of a future one for maritime security.  
Ultimately, it is hoped that the efforts and results of this research can be used to enhance 
the security of waterways proximal to both the US and Singapore. 
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APPENDIX.  QUESTIONNAIRE FOR VALIDATING THE INTENT 




The purpose of this questionnaire is to validate the intent models developed in the 
thesis on a multiagent system (MAS) for tracking the intent of surface contacts.  The 
main goal of this MAS is the identification of possible hostilities posed by surface 
contacts moving in busy ports and waterways.  In order to achieve this goal, the MAS has 
three main objectives: 
 
1. To help the human operator monitor high volume traffic conditions in the port and 
surrounding waterways 
2. To monitor that vessels comply with the safety and security rules of the port and 
waterways 
3. To help the decision maker identify suspicious behaviors by surface contacts 
 
The thesis is only a preliminary investigation into the modeling of surface contact 
intent.  The intent models are not considered exhaustive as they only use a very small and 
basic set of parameters and track attributes.  It is expected that there will be many more 
parameters that may be used by human experts in determining the intent of surface 
contacts. 
 
The focus of this validation will only be on the intent models of the MAS only.  









Name (optional): __________________ 
 
E-mail (optional): __________________ 
 
Number of years of Surface Warfare experience: _________ 
 
Number of years of At-Sea/Patrol experience: ___________ 
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Objective 1.0 
To help the human operator monitor high volume traffic conditions in the port and 
surrounding waterways 
 
• Based on your experience, how important is this objective? 
• Based on your opinion, how did the MAS perform in addressing this objective? 
• Please circle your answers for both the importance of the objective and the MAS 
performance. 
• Please also state any comments on how the MAS performance can be improved 
further with respect to this objective. 
 




Important Poor Good 
1.0 To help the human 
operator monitor high 
volume traffic conditions 
in the port and surrounding 
waterways 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Comments: 
1.1 To monitor multiple 
surface contacts of all 
types (PCG, military, 
cruise liners, leisure, 
tankers, fishing, oiler) 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Comments: 
1.2 To monitor multiple 
security zones of HVUs 
(High Value Units) (cruise 
liners, tankers) 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Comments: 
1.3 To monitor restricted 
areas (oil refineries, 
cruise center, military 
installations) 





To monitor that vessels comply with the safety and security rules of the port and 
waterways 
 
• Based on your experience, how important is this objective? 
• Based on your opinion, how well did the MAS perform in achieving this 
objective? 
• Please circle your answers for both the importance of the objective and the MAS 
performance. 
• Please also state any comments on how the MAS performance can be improved 
further with respect to this objective. 
 




Important Poor Good 
2.0 To monitor that vessels 
comply with the safety and 
security rules of the port 
and waterways 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Comments: 
2.1 To check for current 
track violations 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Comments: 
2.1.1 Current incursions 
into the security zones of 
HVUs (cruise liners, 
tankers) 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Comments: 
2.1.2 To check for current 
incursions into restricted 
areas (cruise center, oil 
refineries, military 
installations) 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Comments: 
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Important Poor Good 
2.1.3 To check for illegal 
activities in restricted areas 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Comments: 
2.1.3.1 Fishing in a non-
fishing zone 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Comments: 
2.1.3.2 Cruising in an Area 
To Be Avoided (ATBA) 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Comments: 
2.1.4 To check for Traffic 
Separation Scheme (TSS) 
violations 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Comments: 
2.1.4.1 Traveling against 
traffic direction 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Comments: 
2.1.4.2 Stopping in a traffic 
lane 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Comments: 
2.1.4.3 Stopping in a TSS 
termination zone 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Comments: 
2.1.5 To check for speed 
violations in restricted 
areas 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Comments: 
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Important Poor Good 
2.1.5.1 Speed violation in a 
harbor 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Comments: 
2.1.5.2 Speed violations in 
a traffic lane 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Comments: 
2.1.6 To check for Vessel 
Traffic Service (VTS) 
violations 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Comments: 
2.1.6.1 Collision detection 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Comments: 
2.2 To check for future 
track violations 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Comments: 
2.2.1 To check for future 
incursions into the security 
zones of HVUs (cruise 
liners, tankers) using 
Closest Point of Approach 
(CPA) and Time to CPA 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Comments: 
2.2.2 To check for future 
incursions into restricted 
areas (cruise center, oil 
refineries, military 
installations) 





To help the decision maker identify suspicious or potentially hostile surface contacts 
 
• Based on your experience, how important is this objective? 
• Based on your opinion, how did the MAS perform in addressing this objective? 
• Please circle your answers for both the importance of the objective and the MAS 
performance. 
• Please also state any comments on how the MAS performance can be improved 
further with respect to this objective. 
 




Important Poor Good 
3.0 To help the decision 
maker identify suspicious 
or potentially hostile 
surface contacts 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Comments: 
3.1 To find atypical track 
behaviors 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Comments: 
3.1.1 To check for 
excessive speed based on 
track types (fishing, 
leisure) 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Comments: 
3.1.2 To check for 
excessive number of track 
violations 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Comments: 
3.1.3 To detect 
participation in 
coordinated attacks 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Comments: 
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Important Poor Good 
3.1.3.1 To detect 
coordinated attack 
(swarm/”wolf-pack”) on a 
HVU/restricted area 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Comments: 
3.2 To determine threat 
level posed by surface 
contact 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Comments: 
3.2.1 To perform surface 
threat assessment based on 
track’s attributes 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Comments: 
3.2.1.1 Threat assessment 
based on Track Type 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Comments: 
3.2.1.2 Threat assessment 
based on Track Flag 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Comments: 
3.2.1.3 Threat assessment 
based on Track Origin 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Comments: 
3.2.1.4 Threat assessment 
based on Track 
Destination 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Comments: 
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Important Poor Good 
3.2.1.5 Threat assessment 
based on Track ESM 
(Unknown, No emitter, 
I-Band, X-Band, Others) 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Comments: 
3.2.1.6 Threat assessment 
based on Voice 
Communication with 
Track(Yes, No) 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Comments: 
3.3 To adapt to the needs 
of the decision maker 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Comments: 
3.3.1 To provide user-
defined biases (weights) 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Comments: 
3.3.2 To incorporate 
regional intelligence (5 x 
MARSEC levels) biases 





These are possible future enhancements that may be added to the MAS 
 
• Based on your opinion/experience, how important are these enhancements? 
• Please also state any comments on how the enhancements can be implemented. 
 





1. Detect more track maneuvers 
1 2 3 4 5 
Comments: 
1.1 Detect unusual zig-zags track maneuvers 
1 2 3 4 5 
Comments: 
1.2 Detect course changes (of a suspected 
track to match movements of a HVU 1 2 3 4 5 
Comments: 
1.3 Monitor course/heading of tracks in 
further detail (e.g. in terms of Steady and 
closing/opening or Turn to closing/opening) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Comments: 
1.4 Detect hiding/evading from Police Coast 
Guards (PCG)/military patrols 1 2 3 4 5 
Comments: 
2. Check for additional VTS violations 1 2 3 4 5 
Comments: 
2.1 Failure to submit Offshore Advance 
reports 1 2 3 4 5 
Comments: 
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2.2 Unknown/wrong destination 1 2 3 4 5 
Comments: 
3. Detect more coordinated activities 1 2 3 4 5 
Comments: 
3.1 Detect simultaneous attacks on multiple 
HVUs or restricted areas 1 2 3 4 5 
Comments: 
4. Incorporate more specific regional 
intelligence 1 2 3 4 5 
Comments: 
4.1 Specific intelligence based on track 
attributes (track type, origin, activity) 1 2 3 4 5 
Comments: 
4.2 Specific intelligence based on historical 
data (e.g. piracy reports) 1 2 3 4 5 
Comments: 
5. Proactive search by agents for more track 
information i.e. form a paper trail from 
information sources such as databases of ship 
registration, sail plans, Offshore Advance 
reports, cargo/passenger manifests etc 













































End of Questionaire 
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